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PERCHANCE TO DREAM: THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY A·ND THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 
MICHAEL S. KNOLL* 
I. THE LEGACY OF THE 1980s 
In May 1992, South Central Los Angeles burst into flames. 
Although the immediate cause of that disturbance was the acquittal of 
the four white police officers accused of beating black motorist Rodney 
King, few would deny that the root causes of the riots extend far beyond 
the Los Angeles criminal justice system. Economic frustration is often 
identified as the underlying cause, although U.S. social and racial policies 
are also frequently identified. 1 Of course, the economic frustrations that 
were and continue to be felt in South Central Los Angeles are shared by 
many nationwide. Many of the roots of these frustrations, however, are 
international, extending to all comers of the globe from which U.S. busi-
nesses and workers face competition. 2 
The integration of the United States into the global economy, com-
monly termed globalization, is occurring and is likely to continue for 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California. A.B. 1977, A.M. 1980, 
Ph.D. 1983, J.D. 1984, University of Chicago. Dick Craswell, Eric Claeys, Ron Garet, Morris Mor-
kre, Chris Stone, and Therese Tuttle provided valuable suggestions. Kenny Gersh assisted with the 
research, and I presented the paper to faculty and research assistants at U.S.C. Thanks to all. Copy-
right 1993 by Michael S. Knoll. All rights reserved. 
1. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fire This Time, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571 (1993); Paul 
Hoffman, The Feds. Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling 
Police Abuse in America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1462-71 (1993); Lisa C. lkemoto, Traces of the 
Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed 
"Los Angeles." 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993); Leonard J. Long, A Problem of the Heart: Few Feel 
for the Poor, 66 S. CAL. L. REV 1317 (1993); Angela E. Ob, Race Relations in Los Angeles: Divide 
and Conquer is Flourishing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1647 (1993). 
2. The car that Rodney King was driving at the time, a Hyundai, was manufactured in South 
Korea. See Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict Relentless Beating, L.A. TIMES. 
Mar. 7, 1991, at Bl. 
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some time before eventually levelling off. 3 Although the received wis-
dom has been that the rising tide of economic growth from globalization 
will raise the incomes of the rich, the middle class, and the poor, evi-
dence from the 1980s contradicts this belief. A consensus has emerged 
that over the previous decade the incomes of the more-educated and 
richer segment of the U.S. population rose and those of the less-educated 
and poorer segment fell.4 Although there remain many unresolved issues 
in understanding the causes of the increase in U.S. inequality over the 
1980s, that increase is well-established.' This Essay describes the role 
globalization plays in increasing U.S. inequality. Building on that foun-
dation, I describe how the advent of the global economy exacerbates con-
flicts in U.S. society and the consequences of globalization for several 
cherished American beliefs. 
II. CURRENTS IN U.S. ECONOMIC HISTORY 
Since colonial times the United States has had a high standard of 
living. Of course, by definition, the wealthy enjoy a higher standard of 
living than the rest of society. What is noteworthy about the history of 
U.S. living standards, however, is that in comparison to the rest of the 
world, it is not the American rich but the American middle class and 
poor that have benefitted most from the high standard of living. That is, 
the standard of living of the American middle class and working poor, 
relative to the standard of living of their foreign counterparts, is higher 
than the same ratio for the rich. 6 
3. President Clinton has not embraced protectionism. See The Global Economy: Who Gets 
Hurt, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 10, 1992, at 48, 50. 
4. See Marvin H. Kosten, Wages and Demographics, in WoRKERS AND THEIR WAGES 1 l, 
Table 1-2 (Marvin H. Kosters ed., 1991); FRANK LEVY & RICHARD MICHEL, THE EcONOMIC 
FuTURE OF AMERICAN FAMILIES: INCOME AND WEALTH TRENDS (1991); Kevin Murphy & Finis 
Welch, The Role of International Trade in Wage Differentials, in WoRKERS AND THEIR. WAGES 39 
(Marvin H. Kosters ed., 1991); ALICE RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE EcONOMY, 
THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT (1993). 
There is substantial disagreement over the magnitude of the increase in inequality. The prob-
lem is complicated because of the large influx of new entrants to the workforce and changing family 
composition. Compare Paul Krugman, Like it or Not, The Income Gap Yawns, WALL ST. J., May 
21, 1992, at A13; with On Keeping the Record Straight, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1992, at Al2. Com-
mentators also disagree on the significance of the increase in inequality, especially over the distribu-
tion of gains from recent economic growth. Compare Paul Krugman, supra, with Michael Boskin, 
Boskin on Krugman, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1992 at A7. Finally, there is a heated debate over the 
effect of conservative domestic policies on income inequality. Compare Krugman, supra, with Bos-
kin, supra. 
S. Frank Levy & Richard Murnane, U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review 
of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1333, 1372-73 (1992). 
6. Susan Dentzer, The Wealth of Nations, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 4, 1992, at 54, 
54. However, by 1980 the United States had a greater percentage of its population living in poverty 
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From colonial times the New World provided (free) working men 
and women with a good living. For many, what America offered was not 
so much the opportunity to strike it rich, as in the stories of Horatio 
Alger7 but a higher standard of living for the common worker than could 
be attained in his or her native land. The source of this wealth at first 
was the abundance of natural resources, most notably arable land. 
Although capital was limited in the colonies, land was virtually unlim-
ited and, when combined with labor, produced a wide variety of agricul-
tural products. Because farmers in much of Europe and Asia had lower 
quality land and less of it, labor was less productive there than in the 
New World. This higher level of productivity led to a higher wage rate 
and standard of living and encouraged many Asians and Europeans to 
make the long, hard journey to the New World.8 
In time the United States evolved from an agricultural economy into 
an industrial one. In a manufacturing society, the relative abundance of 
capital is a more important determinant of wages than is land. Through-
out much of its history, the United States has sustained high rates of 
capital formation for prolonged periods of time.9 With the exception of 
the Civil War, the United States has avoided serious destruction of its 
capital base. Thus, U.S. workers have had more capital with which to 
work than did their foreign counterparts. However, of even greater 
importance than the depth of the capital base are the level of technology 
than did other modern industrial nations. John Coder et al., Inequality Among Children and Elderly 
in Ten Motkm Nations: The United States in an International Context, 79 AM. EcoN. REv., PAPEJlS 
AND PROCEEDINGS 320, 322-23 (1989). 
7. See, e.g., HORATIO ALGER, JR.', RAGOED DICK; OR STREET LIFE IN NEW YORK WITH 
THE BooTBLACKS (1868). In Ragged Dick, a poor shoeshine boy rises to wealth through hard work, 
perseverance and honesty. This fonnula, which was repeated by Alger in scores of books during the 
last third of the Nineteenth Century, came to be known as the "Alger hero," the fictional embodi-
ment of the American rags-to-riches success story. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPEDIA 
263 (1991). Of course, Alger's stories are fiction, but apparently so is the public image of Horatio 
Alger as the popularizer of the American dream of financial success. A recent biography of Alger 
argues that the heroes in Alger's books rarely rose to great wealth or power, more commonly attain-
ing only middle-class respectability, and that the transformation of Alger into American mythmaker 
occurred posthumously and for largely political reasons. GARY ScHARNHORST & JACK BALES, THE 
LosT LIFE OF HORATIO ALGER, JR. 148-56 (1985). 
8. See PAUL SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS 627 (lith ed. 1980). Economics teaches that labor in 
unregulated markets is paid its marginal product. Moreover, the marginal product of labor is 
higher, when there is a 8tpller proportion of labor to available land and capi.tal. Although ~pital 
was scarce in the New waid, land was not. The scarce factor was labor, whach was well paad as a 
result. 
9. HARRY ScHEIBER ET AL., AMERICAN EcONOMIC HISTORY 13 (1976). 
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~d the quality of labor. 10 Here again, the United States has been fortu-
~~e. U.S. openness to experimentation and innovation has been credited 
wilh placing the country at the technological forefront by the end of 
World War I. 11 That lead accelerated until the diffusion of technology in 
r~ent decades caused much of that lead to dissipate. 12 As for the quality 
of labor, in spite of numerous persistent and seemingly intractable 
problems, such as poverty and discrimination, the levels of education and 
physical health of the U.S. worker have remained high throughout the 
nation's history. 13 Once again this translated into higher wages and a 
higher standard of living for American workers than for their foreign 
counterparts. 
The economic history of the United States is largely a story of rapid 
growth, with the country sustaining rapid population and long-term per 
capita income increases over most of its history. 14 That history has had a 
profound influence on U.S. society and politics. It created a society with 
a broad middle class, a republic in which the average American had a 
stake in the status quo and was optimistic about the future because of the 
likely prospect of continued economic growth. 15 
10. See generally EDWARD DENNISON, TRENDS IN AMERICAN GROWTH, 1929-82 (1982); 
Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 
312 (1957). 
11. NATHAN ROSENBERG & L. BIRDZELL, How THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 211-41 (1986). 
12. MICHAEL DERTOUZOS ET AL., MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE COMPETITIVE 
EDGE 23-25 (1993). 
13. ScHEIBER ET AL., supra note 9, at 11. Although standardized test scores fell from 1966 
through 1979, they have been rising since 1979 and have returned to their 1966level. John Bishop, 
Achievement, Test Scores and Relative Wages, in WORKERS AND THEIR WAGES, supra note 4, at 
146. 
14. For example, between 1920 and 1970, real per capita income in the United States increased 
by 250% and the mean American income was 60 percent above that of other developed nations. 
SCHEIBER ET AL., supra note 9, at 7. 
15. KEVIN PHILLIPS, BOILING POINT: REPUBLICANS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE DECLINE OF 
MIDDLE-CLASS PR.OSPER.ITY 14-15 (1993). Study after study shows that the wealthy received a 
disproportionate share of income gains in the 1980s. Eg., Kosters, supra note 4; LEVY & MICHEL, 
supra note 4; Congressional Budget Office, House Ways and Means Committee, Overview of Entitle-
ment Programs ("Green Book") 1521 (1992). The data describe two phenomena. The first is a 
sharp slowdown in the rate of income growth beginning in 1973. For example, disposable income 
per full-time worker increased by 2.45% a year from l947 through 1973 but by only 0.67% a year 
from 1973 through 1988. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1333 n.l. The second is an acceleration 
in earnings inequality. Id. at 1343-45 & Table 2 (twenty-two series of inequality, compiled by seven 
groups of authors, for all earners, men and women, showing increasing inequality over portion of 
1980s examined). The 1980s, which exhibited slow growth in average (both mean and median) and 
income with . increased variation around that average, increased the ranks of the poor and the 
wealthy while the ranks of the middle class decreased. /d. at 1333; John Bound & George Johnson, 
Wages in the United States During the 1980s and Beyond, in WORKERS AND THEIR WAGES, supra 
note 4, at 77, 77-80. But see RICHARD McKENZIE, THE "FORTUNATE FIFTH" FALLACY 18-19 
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III. CONSEQUENCES OF A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The integration of the United States into the global economy has 
occurred rapidly. Between 1950 and 1980, the share of U.S. gross 
national product ("GNP") involved in international trade increased 
nearly tenfold, from two percent to almost twenty percent. 16 Trade is 
not the only way in which the United States has become integrated into 
the &}obal economy. There are also closer ties through capital flow and 
tec~ology transfer; these are increasingly operating not just from the 
United States to foreign countries but also from foreign countries to the 
United States. 
The economic consequences of U.S. integration in the global econ-
omy are profound. A global market for goods gives U.S. consumers 
more choices and lower prices. Although it provides jobs in export 
industries and eliminates jobs in import-competing industries, the net 
change is approximately zero. With job loss and job creation approxi-
mately equal, the frequently debated and highly contentious issue of the 
total number of jobs is a red herring. 17 The underlying issues are distrib-
utive-who has the jobs and at what wages-because globalization can 
have a dramatic impact on wages, especially relative wages, within the 
economy. 
The first economic principle that must be understood is that the 
movement of goods, like the movement of workers, tends to reduce cross-
border wage differences. In effect, the cross-border movement of goods 
places workers in different countries in competition with one another. 18 
For example, because steel is produced in the United States and in South 
Korea, trade restrains how much higher U.S. steelworker wages can be 
than those of their South Korean counterparts. If U.S. wages in the steel 
industry were too high, U.S. steel would not be able to compete with 
South Korean steel that would, as a result, pour into the United States 
and other countries. This would lead to a decline in U.S steel production 
and a loss of jobs in the domestic steel industry. Thus, in a global market 
(Ctr. for the Study of Am. Business Policy Study No. Ill, 1992) (arguing that incomes of all quin-
tiles grew over the 1980s, but the rate of growth was the greatest for the highest quintile). 
16. JOHN BARTON & BART FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: REGULAT-
ING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 23 (1986). 
17. Cf. EDWARD GRAHAM 8t PAUL KRUGMAN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 60-62 (2d ed. 1991) (making a similar argument about foreign investment). 
18. One way to state this idea is to recognize that trade in goods can substitute for factor 
mobility. See WILFRED J. ETHIER, MODERN INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMICS 110 (2d ed. 1988). 
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the wages of steelworkers in the United States and South Korea cannot 
be determined independently. 19 
A second way in which globalization reduces cross-border wage dif-
ferences is through the diffusion of technology. Three decades ago U.S. 
commercial technology was unsurpassed. However, since then much of 
the U.S. technological lead has vanished. The availability of comparable 
technology around the world tends to equalize worker productivity, 
reducing cross-border wage differences among similarly skilled 
workers.20 
Globalization has also reduced the capital abundance advantage of 
the United States. At the end of World War II, Europe and Asia were in 
ruin. Their plants were destroyed, their capital base depleted. U.S. 
workers had much more capital with which to work than did their for-
eign counterparts, raising both their productivity and their standard of 
living relative to that of their foreign counterparts.21 However, since 
then, foreign countries have been rebuilt. Furthermore, capital is now 
highly mobile internationally, moving rapidly to seek the highest returns. 
Thus, the U.S. advantage from more abundant capital has lessened.22 
The integration of the United States into the world market does not 
affect all workers equally. Globalization is raising the wages of highly 
skilled U.S. workers and reducing the wages of less skilled U.S. workers. 
This occurs because relative to the rest of the world, the United States 
has an abundance of highly educated workers. Consequently, integration 
places the highly skilled and highly educated segment of the population 
into a pool with relatively few highly skilled and highly educated people, 
thereby raising their wages. Similarly, integration places the less skilled 
and less educated segment of the population into a global pool with an 
abundance of less skilled and less educated workers, thereby lowering 
19. The conclusion that wages will not be determined independently in each country does not 
imply that wages in the two countries wiii be equal. Wages can differ to the extent that transporta-
tion costs or import restraints raise prices in one country. Wages can also differ to the extent that 
worker productivity differs between countries. PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRDHAUS, 
EcONOMICS 680-81 (14th ed. 1992). Productivity will differ to the extent that workers in one coun-
try are more skilled or their country has superior technology or resource endowments, or capital is 
relatively more abundant. 
20. See Robert Z. Lawrence, The International Dimension, in AMERICAN LIVING STAN-
DARDS: THREATS AND CHALLENGES 23, 25 (Robert E. Litan eta). eds., 1988). 
21. Thus, for example, until the early 1970s, U.S. production line workers enjoyed higher liv-
ing standards than U.K. branch bank managers or German supervisors. PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 
30. 
22. See EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 31 (Jan. 1989). 
:I 
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their wages. Because the global pool has relatively more unskilled work-
ers than does the U.S. pool, integration is raising the relative wages of 
skilled workers in the United States. 23 Thus, integration, which tends to 
reduce cross-border differences in wages among similarly skilled work-
ers, 24 has caused the real wages of the highly skilled portion of the U.S. 
workforce to rise and those of the less skilled and unskilled portions to 
fall. 25 The effect is just the opposite for workers in the rest of the world. 
Globalization reduces the relative wages of the highly skilled portion of 
the foreign workforce and raises the wages of the less skilled or unskilled 
portions. 26 
The disparate impact of globalization on highly skilled and less 
skilled U.S. workers is well-supported. The data indicate that over the 
1980s there was a substantial increase in demand for skilled workers rela-
tive to unskilled workers. 27 Part of this shift in demand can be attributed 
to trade flows that have reduced the number of manufacturing jobs, the 
traditional high-wage employer of less-educated men. 28 However, this 
cannot be the complete explanation because declines in demand for less-
educated workers have also occurred within industries.29 Recent years 
have also seen much non-neutral technological change, increasing 
the productivity of highly skilled workers more than that of less-skilled 
and eliminating many middle-class jobs. 30 It has been . argued that 
globalization plays a role in forcing firms to implement such non-neutral 
23. One way to see this is to recognize that wages are detennined by the demand and supply of 
labor. Increased trade, especially increased imports of goods that intensively use low-skilled labor, 
reduces demand for such labor, thereby lowering wages. Also the movement offshore of much man-
ufacturing pushes many of these workers into the nontraded sector, increasing competition and 
reducing wages. 
24. In the international economics literature, this is called the factor-price equalization theo-
rem. This theorem states the following for a two country, two good model: "Free international trade 
between two countries will cause factor prices in the countries to become more equal. If both coun-
tries continue to produce both goods with free trade, their factor prices will actually be equal." 
ETHIER, supra note 14, at 109. 
25. See PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 173; Lester Thurow, The Disappearance of the Middle 
Class, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1987, § 3, at 3; George Borjas et al., On the Labor Market Effects of 
Immigration and Trade (1990), cited in Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1359 & n.73. 
26. At least this is what theory suggests. If so, globalization might reduce global income ine-
quality while increasing U.S. income inequality. 
27. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1371-72. 
28. /d. at 1372. The influence of trade on wages is reflected in the changing composition of 
trade. See Murphy & Welch, supra note 4, at 60-61. It is also reflected in the shift of operation 
abroad. See Bound & Johnson, supra note 15, at 97-101; Marvin H. Kosters, Foreword, in WoRKERS 
AND THEIR WAGES, supra note 4, at xi-xii. 
29. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1372. 
30. /d. at 1362. 
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technological changes because increased foreign competition increases 
the pressure to improve efficiency. 31 
IV. CONFLICTING RESPONSES 
Globalization has not so much created new conflicts as it has inten-
sified existing conflicts. At the broadest level of generality, globalization 
drives a wedge between the concepts of economic efficiency and domestic 
income equality. Although the conflict between these two values pre-
dates the integration of the U.S. economy into the world economy, 
globalization exacerbates this conflict. 32 Globalization raises the cost to 
the nation of using the government's traditional economic policy tools, 
such as tariffs and quotas. On the other hand, the increased inequality 
brought about by globalization strengthens the fairness argument for 
intervention. 33 The results are increased tension, animosity and acrimo-
nious public debate. 34 
There are two standard responses to the dislocations caused by 
imports. One response is to allow the dislocations to occur and to permit 
the dislocated workers and capital to be absorbed by growing sectors of 
the economy. The second response is to preserve jobs and profits by 
restricting imports of the threatening merchandise. 35 Such restrictions 
take ~ variety of forms including tariffs, 36 quotas, 37 voluntary restraint 
31. /d. at 1369. 
32. The conflict between efficiency and equality brought about by globalization arises only if a 
national perspective is taken. Looked at globally, globalization reduces inequality, so there is no 
conflict. This raises the question of what perspective to take for normative analysis: the national 
perspective or the global one. 
33. Using a different vocabulary, the conflict can be described as one between individual auton-
omy and community. 
34. The manifestations have been documented by PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 223. 
35. The United States has restricted imports of steel and textiles, among other items. See 
JAMES BoVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD: HOW CONGRESS PILLAGES THE CONSUMER AND DEC· 
IMATES AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 35-59, 76-92 (1991). 
36. A tariff is a tax levied on imports only. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT'') limits a nation's right to raise tariffs. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 
1947, art. II, T.I.A.S. No. 1700. Countries frequently ignore their obligations, such as the United 
States did in the 1960s when it raised the tariff on trucks to twenty-five percent in a dispute with 
Europe over U.S. chicken exports. The recent battle over whether to apply punitive tariffs to Japa-
nese minivans was an attempt to protect the domestic auto industry. See BOVARD, supra note 35, at 
31. 
. 37. A quota is a quantitative restriction on imports. The United States has country-by-country 
quotas on sugar. David Tarr & Morris Morkre, Aggregate Costs to the United States of Tariffi and 
Quotas on Imports, in THE NEW PROTECTIONIST THREAT TO WORLD WELFARE 221-23 (Dominick 
Salvotore ed., 1987). 
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agreements ("VRAs"), 38 orderly marketing agreements, 39 as well as 
nontariff barriers ("NTBs").40 
The debates over these measures are frequently bitter.41 The stakes 
are large, not only monetarily but also in terms of human suffering and 
individual dignity. The dilemma arises because globalization injures 
some workers and increases the harm to the nation as a whole from the 
intervention that would alleviate the injury to those directly and 
adversely affected. 
A. THE CASE FOR TRADE POLICY 
The harmful adjustments brought about by globalization are con-
centrated on the poorer members of society. Globalization puts people 
out of work, reduces the wages of many by pushing them from the manu-
facturing to the service sector, and swells the ranks of those living in 
poverty. By accelerating income inequality at a time of little income 
growth, globalization raises the specter of the United States becoming a 
two-class society with only rich and poor. Such a possibility is not only 
terribly frightening for the poor, it is anathema for most Americans. 
38. These are agreements by foreign governments to limit exports at the request of the U.S. 
government. VRA's are often undertaken under the threat of trade restrictions. The agreement by 
the government of Japan to limit annual car exports to the United States to 1.68 million vehicles a 
year is the most well-known. Id. at 220-21. 
39. The best known example is the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, under which the United States 
restricts textile imports from forty countries. BoVARD, supra note 35, at 36. 
40. Because of the success of GA TI in reducing tariffs and restricting the use of quantitative 
restrictions, protectionist pressures frequently surface through NTBs, which are comprised of a vari-
ety of policies that burden imports. Among the most colorful of these are Japan's insistence on 
checking tulip bulbs for disease by cutting their stems vertically down the middle, and France's 
insistence in the early 1980s requirement that all videocassette recorders be imported through one 
small, inland, and understaffed custom-house. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 69 (1988); 
David White, Poitien Keeps Video Invaders at Bay with Gallic Sangfroid, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, 
§ 1, at 1. More common and more controversial are import restrictions based on environmental or 
health concerns. For example, is an EC prohibition on beef treated with a growth hormone com-
monly used in the United States designed to protect the health of EC consumers or the purses of EC 
ranchers? Similarly, is the move to restrict U.S. imports of Mexican goods, the manufacture of 
which pollutes the Mexican environment, intended to protect the Mexican environment? Such 
measures pose the conftict between legitimate domestic regulatory ends and impermissible protection 
for domestic industries. 
41. The parties in these disputes play for keeps and have long memories. A former chairwo-
man of the U.S. International Trade Commission and friend of the Clintons was prevented from 
becoming U.S. Trade Representative because of her work on behalf of U.S. steel users in unsuccess-
fully opposing extension of steel VRAs in 1989. See Keith Bradsher, The Transition: Democratic 
Rifts May Hurt Clinton on Foreign Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, § 1, at 1; John Maggs, Stern 
and Bergsten Vie for Deputy USTR Post, J. CoM., Jan. 13, 1993, at A1; Asra Q. Nomani & Bob 
Davis, Trade-Post Fight Rates High on Meanness Meter As Faxes Fault ·a Contender's Support for 
U.S., WALL STREET J., Dec. 1, 1992, at Al. 
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Unemployment and lower wages force people to reduce their living 
standards. But it does more-it threatens their sense of self. For many 
Americans much of their identity is tied to their jobs and to their ability 
to provide for their families. Job loss and reliance on public assistance or 
charity can be devastating. Protecting domestic industries permits these 
people to keep their jobs, provide for their families, remain productive, 
and stay off the dole. 
Those suffering will not only be displaced adults but their children 
as well. The children, of course, are innocent victims, but so are the 
adults. Many never had the opportunity to attain the skills that could 
have led to higher paying jobs. Even those who chose not to pursue the 
high skills path did not anticipate what has happened. They entered the 
workforce, whether in the manufacturing or service sector, with the 
anticipation of secure and steady employment and confident of maintain-
ing their middle-class lifestyles. The world threw them a curve. Of 
course, not all expectations are entitlements and not all harms can be 
alleviated. Even so, when the result is that the rich get richer and the 
poor get poorer, we cannot sit idly by and do nothing to alleviate the 
suffering. 
Furthermore, given the positive correlation between the education, 
status, and income of parents and their children, 42 the negative repercus-
sions threaten to continue for a long time. The evil is exacerbated by a 
national history of racial and ethnic oppression that denies equal oppor-
tunities to a large share of the population. Accordingly, to lock in the 
status quo is to perpetuate earlier and continuing wrongs. 
B. THE CASE AGAINST TRADE POLICY 
Import restrictions are the traditional tool for protecting domestic 
workers from the harmful effects of international trade. By raising prices 
import restrictions harm consumers and downstream producers. Not 
only are such policies inefficient, 43 they are difficult to justify on distribu-
tive grounds. Because the poor spend a larger share of their income than 
the rich, the impact of higher prices is greater on the poor. In addition, 
workers for downstream producers are harmed by import restrictions. 
They stand to lose their jobs or see their incomes fall and are presumably 
as deserving as workers in import-competing industries. Furthermore, 
because import restrictions also reduce exports, such restrictions will 
42. Edward B. Fiske, Education: Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, at BlO. 
43. They are. When harm is measured in terms of willingness to pay, the bann to consumers 
exceeds the gains to the protected workers and capital . 
. i i 
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reduce jobs in the export sector.44 The individuals who are directly and 
adversely affected by globalization are easy to identify; those hurt by 
slowing or reversing globalization are harder to identify but their injuries 
are no less real nor are they any less worthy. 
Trade policy intervention is also shortsighted. A nation's standard 
of living ultimately depends on what it produces. Saving workers' jobs 
keeps them in industries where they are relatively less productive and 
prevents them from moving to jobs where they are more productive. The 
gain to the nation is the savings in short-term transition costs. The harm, 
however, persists indefinitely, as long as the industries continue to oper-
ate inefficiently. In a 1984 monograph, David Tarr and Morris Morkre 
estimated that the one-time adjustment costs from removing all tariffs45 
and quantitative restrictions on automobiles, sugar, textiles,46 and steel 
would be $380 million. The annual benefits would be $9.29 billion, 
nearly twenty-five times as large. Moreover, although the costs would be 
incurred only once, the benefits would continue indefinitely. Expressed 
differently, the annual cost to the nation for each job saved in the steel 
industry is $81,700 whereas each job saved in the auto industry costs 
$225,000 annually.47 
Globalization has also changed the· mix of imports and exports. 
Increasingly international trade is in intermediate goods, such as semi-
conductors and steel, which upstream producers provide to downstream 
producers in order to make final goods, such as personal computers and 
cars. The rapid expansion of trade in intermediate goods has occurred 
because globalization rationalized the production process for many 
goods.48 
The increasing importance of trade in intermediate goods further 
hampers the ability of policymakers to use the traditional tools of trade 
policy to protect jobs and industries. This is because raising the price of 
an intermediate good will reduce the competitiveness of downstream pro-
ducers. Without foreign competition the higher input price leads to an 
44. Before the Civil War, the import-competing industrial North favored higher tariffs; the 
exporting agricultural South favored lower tariffs. The Southerners understood that higher tariffs 
would reduce demand for their exports. JOHN DOBSON, TWO CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACK· 
GROUND AND EMERGENCE OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 49-56 (1976). 
45. The mean tariff was 3.7 percent ad valorem. Tarr & Morkre, supra note 37, at 218. 
46. They considered only restrictions on textiles from Hong Kong, the largest foreign supplier 
of textiles to the United States. /d. at 223-25. 
47. /d. at 221, 226. 
48. See William H. Branson, Trends in United States International Trade and Investment Since 
World War 1/, in THE AMERICAN EcONOMY IN TRANSITION 183, 221-31 (1980). 
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increase in price and a fall in output at the next stage of production. 
However, with international competition in the downstream product 
market, the higher domestic price for the downstream product will result 
in increased imports. The price of the final product will not increase as 
much, but domestic production of the downstream product will fall fur-
ther. A good example of this phenomenon is the semiconductor arrange-
ment between the United States and Japan, which, by raising the price of 
semiconductors in the United States, has been blamed for reducing the 
competitiveness of the semiconductor-intensive U.S. computer 
industry. 49 
C. OTHER ISSUES 
The tendency for globalization to intensify debate is not limited to 
questions of trade policy. It influences the debate over a wide range of 
issues that pit economic incentives against equality. For example, the 
recently enacted family leave bill50 illustrates this conflict. Proponents 
argued that the bill was needed to protect workers who could not take 
time off from work to care for ill family members or newborn children 
for fear oflosing their jobs. 51 Opponents, in contrast, argued that the bill 
would hurt business and ultimately workers by requiring that businesses 
keep jobs open for those on leave for prolonged periods of time. 52 The 
debate was intensified by global competition. Globalization made the 
need for a family leave bill more pressing because declining wages have 
forced many to enter the workforce to make ends meet. 53 On the other 
hand, globalization raised the costs of burdening business, because the 
additional burden would allow foreign competitors to increase exports 
further reducing domestic production. 54 
The family leave bill is not the only debate affected by globalization. 
Debate over a legion of redistributive issues and social programs has 
49. Because Japanese computer companies could obtain semiconductors more cheaply than 
their U.S. counterparts, they made substantial gains on their counterparts. ARTHUR DENZAU, 
TRADE PROTECTION COMES TO SILICON VALLEY 3-6 (Ctr. for the Study of Am. Business Formal 
Publication No. 86, 1988). 
SO. The family leave bill requires employers of 50 or more persons to provide their employees 
with up to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave to care for a family member or because of 
their own illness. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993). 
S 1. Pros cf Cons: Should Congress Override the Veto of the Family and Medical Leave Act?, 72 
CoNG. DIG. 14, 14 (1993) (comments of Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT)) [hereinafter Pros & 
Cons]. 
52. /d. at 31 (comments of Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA)). 
53. See PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 101. 
54. Pros & Cons, supra note 51, at 15 (comments of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT). 
I I'.:, '·,'' 
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intensified. The conflict results from the increased need for help and the 
in<~reased cost of providing that help through regulation. 
Income inequality increased by globalization will also exacerbate 
existing tensions in preferential hiring and admission programs. Widen-
ing income inequality raises the value of being admitted to a prestigious 
school or of getting a prized job. It thus raises the stakes of affirmative 
action: The beneficiaries stand to gain more and those who feel wrongly 
excluded stand to lose more. Given the divisive views that already exist, 
raising the stakes will make a consensus harder to reach and the debate 
more volatile. 
One possible response to the increased income inequality brought 
about by globalization is to reverse the impact through redistributive 
income taxes. Economists widely recognize that such a response is less 
disruptive than trade restrictions because it interferes less with individu-
als' production and consumption choices. 55 Although tax policy is less 
disruptive than trade policy, it is still disruptive. 56 In order to reverse the 
income allocative effects of globalization, the tax burden on lower 
bracket individuals will have to be reduced and the burden on higher 
bracket individuals will have to be increased. In short a more progressive 
tax regime would be necessary. 57 Although it is obvious that a more 
progressive tax regime would reduce income inequality, it is also true 
that greater progressivity would increase the disruption imposed by the 
tax system. 58 For example, a more progressive income tax schedule 
would blunt the economy's signal to those choosing careers by raising the 
wages of less productive employment and reducing those of more pro-
ductive employment. 59 These and other social tensions exacerbated by 
globalization are likely to manifest themselves in economically diverse 
areas where winners and losers are close together, like Los Angeles. 
55. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 19, at 687. 
56. /d. 
57. The point is not simply that a progressive income tax schedule instead of a flat one would 
be necessary, but that globalization makes a more progressive tax schedule necessary to achieve the 
same distribution of after-tax income. 
58. See RICHARD MUSGRAVE & PEGGY MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 284 (5th ed. 1989). 
59. The conftict between improving investment incentives and reducing economic inequality 
are illustrated in the debate over President Clinton's proposed tax reforms. See Nobelists Rate 
Clintonomics, WALL STREET J., March 23, 1993, at A14. 
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V. CONSEQUENCES FOR AMERICAN BELIEFS 
Like every country, the United States has a culture of secular beliefs. 
Some are more myth than reality; others are more real. Whether mostly 
fact or fiction, these beliefs developed over many years when the U.S. 
economy was more isolated than it is today. These beliefs are important 
for several reasons. They define who we are: We are a nation with a 
broad middle class. They also inform our expectations: The standard of 
living of each succeeding generation exceeds that of preceding genera-
tions. Frequently, the basis for the belief is forgotten by the public, 
which only remembers the belief. Unfortunately, globalization has 
eroded the economic conditions upon which many of these beliefs are 
based. The impact of globalization on these beliefs is described below. 
The consequences for some of these beliefs are obvious. As a result 
of stagnant income growth, Americans are no longer confident that their 
lives will be materially richer than those of their parents. 60 
Globalization is also changing the picture of America as a nation 
with a broad and growing middle class. Statistics cited at the beginning 
of this Essay61 underscore a threat to the existence of a broad middle 
class. "Middle class" is not a statistical concept, defined by a relative 
position in a distribution, but a standard of living. It is the ability to 
afford the basic items of a middle-class lifestyle.62 Defined this way, most 
Americans view themselves as part of the middle class. However, the 
number that can maintain that lifestyle has been falling. 63 
A. THE ROAD TO THE GOOD LIFE 
In the United States, which has a large portion of highly educated 
people and many of the best educational institutions in the world, an 
education has long been viewed as a path to the middle class and beyond. 
Even so, education has not been viewed as the only road to the American 
Dream of a middle class lifestyle. One could enjoy that lifestyle without 
attending college. The worker with a small suburban house, a car or two 
in the driveway, and perhaps a boat, is part of the post-World War II 
American landscape. 
60. PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 167-92. 
61. See supra notes 4, 5, & 15. 
62. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1338. 
63. Phillips, supra note 15, at 3. 
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Although college is not the guarantee of success that it once was, the 
CO!it of not going to college has increased. 64 Because of globalization, 
which tends to place workers around the world with similar skills into 
the! same pool for wage determination, fewer U.S. workers are able to 
afford a middle-class lifestyle.65 The reduced opportunities for low 
skilled workers to enjoy a middle-class lifestyle forecloses one road to the 
middle class: finish high school, keep your nose clean, and get a good job. 
It is no longer enough to slide through school without receiving either a 
basic or vocational education. Instead, workers will need to have more 
skills, whether learned in school or on the job, to achieve a middle-class 
lifestyle. 66 
B. A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 
No country but the United States could have as an icon the Statute 
of Liberty with the inscription from Emma Lazarus: "Give me your 
tired, your poor, your huddled masses . . . . " For most Americans, 
including the author, the United States provided our poor ancestors with 
an. opportunity to make a better life. Without that opportunity many of 
us might never have been born or would be living in harsh and oppressive 
conditions. Although there have always been some Americans who want 
1to curtail immigration severely to keep out others who are different, 
:many find troubling the thought of denying others the opportunities our 
ancestors were fortunate to have had. 
Although all the data are not yet in, many observers believe that 
poorly educated, poorly skilled citizens and residents suffer most from 
immigration. Because, relative to the existing population, the new immi-
grant population is less educated and has fewer marketable skills, 67 
immigrants not only compete with similarly situated citizens and resi-
dents for jobs, but the additional labor tends to hold down wages for the 
poor.68 In contrast, the wealthy benefit from the inftux because highly 
skilled workers and minimally skilled workers do not compete with each 
64. Levy & Murnane, supra note 5, at 1356-57. 
65. The squeeze comes about because higher wages would mean higher prices for domesticly 
produced goods. However, foreign competition prevents prices from rising because demand for a 
company's product would be sharply reduced. As a consequence, real wages fall, pushing many 
workers out of the middle class and creating few opportunities for the next generation. 
66. Between 1979 and 1987, the proportion of male high-school graduates between 25 and 34 
who earned more than $20,000 (in 1988 dollars) fell from 57% to 46%. Levy & Murnane, supra 
note 5, at 1353 n.60. 
67. ld. at 1359 (citing Borjas et al., supra note 25). 
68. See Bound & Johnson, supra note 15, at 83-84. 
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other for jobs. Instead, to the wealthy, minimally skilled immigrants are 
an inexpensive source of labor providing services more cheaply. 
Further restricting immigration would reduce the population of less 
educated workers. As a result, the wages of less educated workers would 
likely rise, and thereby their standard of living. It, of course, would be 
desirable to improve living standards without further restricting immi-
gration, but that might not prove feasible. If it is true that the poorly 
educated bear most of the brunt of immigration, we are faCed with a 
difficult choice between further restricting immigration and improving 
the standard of living of the resident poor. 69 
C. A CLASSLESS SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY 
Perhaps our most cherished secular myth is that the United States is 
an egalitarian, classless society. A well known recent expression of this 
myth was the statement by then-President Bush, a child of the upper 
crust, that class and privilege belong to the Old World, not to the New.70 
Of course, class differences exist in the United States as they always 
have. 71 Globalization did not create class differences, but it has been 
widening the economic gap between classes. 72 Because growing eco-
nomic inequality translates into lifestyle differences with fewer shared 
experiences, globalization makes class differences more pronounced. It 
also makes the U.S. class structure more rigid because the shrinkage in 
middle-class jobs is reducing opportunities to join the middle class. 
By exacerbating class differences, globalization is also threatening 
our sense of community. The slow growth in per capita income and 
widening income inequality create the perception that interests across 
classes are no longer aligned. Of course, there have always been both 
shared and divergent interests, but declining opportunity creates an envi-
ronment in which people fearful of the future will grab what they can 
now. It also creates the perception that what one consumes comes at the 
expense of others. 73 Thus, because ethnic, racial, and religious ties are 
69. For a discussion of this issue in the context of the Los Angeles riots, see Jack Miles, Blacks 
vs. Browns: African-Americans and Latinos, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1992, at 41. 
70. Benjamin DeMott, The Myth of C/asslessness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at A23. 
71. For a description of the important role class plays in the United States, see BENJAMIN 
DEMOTT, THE IMPERIAL MIDDLE: WHY AMERICANS CAN'T THINK STRAIGHT ABOUT CLASS 
(1990). 
12. For example, in 1989 the income share of the top one percent ofthe U.S. population rose 
from 8.3 percent in 1977 to 13.0 percent, while that of the middle quintile fell from 16.3 percent to 
14.7 percent. KEVIN PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 277. 
73. For the classic statement of this proposition, see LESTER THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM Soci-
ETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR EcONOMIC CHANGE ( 1980). 
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strong, declining opportunity and slow economic growth encourage 
polarization thereby weakening our community.74 Moreover, the fric-
tions between groups are likely to erupt in urban areas, such as Los 
Angeles, with heavy concentrations of different racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious groups. 7s 
D. A STABLE DEMOCRACY BASED ON A STAKE FOR ALL 
A notion related to the large American middle class is that our 
republican form of government is supported by a population with a 
strong interest in national policies. A stable democratic government can 
only be built around an informed citizenry with a stake in society. The 
key is the stake. It provides the incentive to be informed and the percep-
tion, if not the reality, of alignment of interest. It also introduces a cer-
tain conservatism, an opposition to fundamental change, that makes for 
stable government. The fear is that if inequality continues to grow, strat-
ification and polarization in the U.S. economy, by creating social and 
political turmoil, will produce a chronically unstable government. 76 
VI. NEW THINKING: HIGH-SKILLS STRATEGY 
The need to ameliorate the suffering caused by globalization and the 
realization that traditional trade policy instruments have many harmful 
side effects have forced policymakers to look elsewhere for solutions. 
The realization that in the long run a society's standard of living is deter-
mined by its level of productivity has led many observers to conclude 
that the way to raise living standards is to raise worker productivity by 
improving workers' skills. 77 Although recognizing that a more skilled 
workforce could ameliorate the harms from globalization is easy, achiev-
ing that result is not. 
The prospects for improving the skill of existing workers and future 
workers differ. Existing workers who have lost their jobs because of 
changing global trade patterns have a variety of retraining programs 
available to them. Unfortunately, however, these programs have poor 
track records, insufficiently compensating workers for their lost income 
and actually delaying adjustment by discouraging workers from taking 
74. "Ethnic, racial and religious tensions in the United States have typically accompanied hard 
times as individuals and groups worry about lost jobs, declining incomes and competition for scarce 
rewards." PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 237. 
75. See id. at 236-44. 
76. Thurow, supra note 25, at 3. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 1-81. 
77. See The Global Economy: Who Gets Hurt, supra note 3, at 48. 
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new jobs at lower wages. 78 Although these programs have a lot of room 
for improvement, it is unreasonable to expect that most displaced work-
ers will find new· jobs at their old wages. Even with a vastly improved 
adjustment assistance program, many will only be able to find jobs at 
reduced wages. 
Future workers provide cause for both optimism and concern. The 
reason for optimism is because it is easier to train than to retrain, and 
with many more working years ahead of those not yet in the workforce, 
education and training are better investments for both them and society. 
Thus there is a good opportunity to provide individuals not yet in the 
workforce with the necessary skills. The reason for concern is the dire 
state of public education.79 Moreover, because primary and secondary 
education programs last twelve years, it is unlikely that the economic 
trends can be reversed soon, even if education is improved immediately. 
The threat facing the United States is not only economic stagnation 
but a continuing trend of slow economic growth and widening income 
inequality. Unless we create a more productive workforce, from the 
skilled to the unskilled, there may come a day when the United States 
has a somewhat larger elite, a much smaller middle class, and many more 
poor. Unless these trends are reversed, the conflicts described in Section 
IV will continue to intensify and the secular beliefs described in Section 
V will be further challenged. 80 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is much in the Los Angeles riots of 1992 that is unique to 
African-Americans. There are, however, other aspects that cut across 
racial lines. Among the most important of these are the economic chal-
lenges and frustrations facing less educated Americans. These frustra-
tions show no signs of abating. They are in part caused by powerful 
global forces and are likely to continue. The globalization of the U.S. 
78. ROBERT LAWRENCE & ROBERT LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE: A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH 52 (1986). 
79. In spite of the large amounts spent on primacy and secondary education, U.S. students lag 
behind their foreign counterparts in math and science. PAUL KENNEDY, PREPARING FOR THE 
TwENTY-FIRST CENTuRY 305-07 (1993). 
80. The need to encourage investment and training suggests another possible conflict-between 
initiative and compassion. Although these two values are not contradictory, in a world of sound 
bites and simple messages they might not coexist easily. It becomes too easy to confuse the results of 
a lack of initiative with those of ill fortune or discrimination. The myth that the United States is a 
classless society causes many people to attribute incorrectly lack of success to personal failings 
. instead of to class-based hurdles. See DEMOTT, supra note 70. 
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economy has reduced the market demand in ~he United States for 
unskilled and marginally skilled workers, driving down the incomes of 
the less educated segment of the population, forcing some out of the mid-
dle class, and making it more difficult for others to lead a middle-class 
lifestyle. Thus, unless the skill level of the less educated segment of the 
U.S. population is significantly improved, globalization threatens to fur-
ther erode living standards and exacerbate wealth differences. If so, such 
violence will become more common.81 Although the threat is greatest in 
minority communities, no portion of the nation is immune. 82 
On an abstract level, globalization highlights the clash between two 
competing groups of policy norms, those relating to economic efficiency 
and those relating to fairness, as measured from a domestic perspective. 83 
Perhaps because globalization is primarily an economic process, the eco-
nomic consequences of globalization have been more thoroughly studied 
than its social and political ramifications. Of course, integration into a 
global marketplace has important consequences for U.S. society above 
and beyond what it means for the U.S. economy. This Essay raises some 
of these noneconomic consequences; they deserve more attention. 
More generally, this Essay illustrates a commonly observed phe-
nomenon: Neither normative nor positive analysis alone can generate 
useful policy prescriptions. Normative analysis focuses on the question 
of what should be done; positive analysis on the constraints on what can 
be done. To meet the challenges ahead, it will be necessary to draw on 
both normative and positive analyses. 
81. Robin Wright of the Los Angeles Times argues that the Los Angeles riots are part of a 
global trend towards greater urban violence because of decreasing opportunities available to the 
urban poor. Robin Wright, LA. Riots Called Symptom of Worldwide Urban Trend, L.A. TIMES, 
May 2!1, 1992, at Al. 
82. This point was made by Bill Clinton as a presidential candidate. Arsenio Hall Show (tele-
vision broadcast, June 3, 1992). 
83. Looking at globalization from an international perspective cautions against reversing the 
trend of rising domestic inequality in ways that would increase global inequality. Thus, restrictions 
on trade, capital flows, and technology transfer are likely to be normatively undesirable because of 
their harmful international effects. A global perspective would also caution against tightening immi-
gration, even if such a restriction benefitted the poorest Americans, because of the harm to even 
poorer immigrants. Such a perspective might also place little value on weakening the sense of an 
American community, especially if the sense of a world community were strengthened. 
There are two reasons for the indefiniteness expressed above. First, the analysis is static, not 
dynamic. Second, there are other normative principles of entitlement besides reducing inequality 
which require consideration. 
